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Introduction 
Despite nearly seven decades of Nuclear weapons, (NWs) and four decades of Cold war in which 
they figured prominently, we still do not know very much about, or with any degree of assurance, 
what NWs can and cannot do beyond create widespread destruction. Questions about 
deterrence, extended deterrence and the political utility of NWs and whether these are general 
propositions/ laws or culturally or state specific, cannot be reliably answered. 
In this paper I first discuss extended deterrence during the Cold war and after. I then turn to the 
case of Iran. The paper is thus doubly speculative, raising questions about how extended 
deterrence might apply in the case of Iran; discussing several features of the case and 
speculating about how Iran might react in a nuclear context. The questions are intended to 
stimulate further thinking about the specific and more general propositions. These can—and 
doubtless will—be fleshed out in the course of events. 
My principal thesis is that the greatest danger from Iran stems from the risks of misjudgment 
rather than conscious risk-taking; that the extension by the United States of security guarantees 
to the GCC may be much easier than any nuclear guarantees; that in any event the GCC 
recipients (unlike Europeans /Japan) are ambivalent and reluctant about such guarantees. 
Nuclear guarantees may be less credible and less politically feasible for the U.S.. Whether they 
are necessary appears doubtful. Deterrence of Iranian conventional aggression against the GCC 
states by conventional defense, and of missiles by missile defense, should weaken any 
advantage Iran might gain from an "enhanced" nuclear shadow. Nuclear deterrence is to counter 
nuclear threats. As long as there is a sizeable U.S. presence in the Arabian peninsula, any such 
threats would inevitably involve the United States and its deterrent. The extension of a formal 
nuclear guarantee to the GCC states beyond this would appear excessive and certainly 
premature. 
Extended Deterrence: The Cold War and Today 
In retrospect the problem of deterrence and its extension during the Cold War, looks simple 
compared to the period following it. Two blocs clearly delimited, no territorial dispute as such, and 
relatively easy measurement of threat deterrence made devising a deterrent strategy less 
demanding. The extension of deterrence though was never easy. The U.S. guarantee of Europe 
had to deter the USSR, and reassure allies, which implied being credible without being alarming 
or provocative. The problem was that the European allies were never ready to counter the 
USSR's conventional superiority by their own efforts.[1] 
A non-nuclear defense of Europe being infeasible meant reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 
But this became decreasingly credible if it required the United States to commit suicide in the 
event of an attack on Europe. While talk of raising or lowering the threshold of nuclear use 
alarmed allies, it became clear that the alliance need “flexible options.” Various options were 
considered over time: massive retaliation, limited war and even shared forces (MLF). The 
stationing of U.S. forces in Europe acting as a ‘tripwire’ was considered an indication of the 
reliability of the guarantee. Experience appears to endorse the wisdom of Dennis Healey’s 
theorem that “it takes more to reassure allies than to deter the adversary.” 
The period since has become more complicated as threats have multiplied and diffused globally 
and the reassuring lines of blocs and armories have given way to nuclear aspirants and regional 
threats. States unable to fight modern wars can now do great damage at some distance from 
their own territory. Tomorrow’s nuclear powers may be deficient in most other components of 
power. And the acquisition of nuclear power may become banalized rather than a reflection of 
underlying power or a source of status.[2] 
Together with this the international system has moved from a bipolar to a unipolar and, some now 
argue, a non or a-polar system. Projecting the U.S. role and the international environment is 
difficult. The National Intelligence Council in analyzing the future U.S. role has noted two 
possibilities of concern to us: “ the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence security 
guarantees, which could fuel new regional arms races … and ... a diminished “interest and 
willingness to play a leadership role “ given its costs and possible domestic political pressures.[3] 
This of course raises the more specific question: what happens to existing U.S. security 
guarantees[4] and how would it affect willingness to assume new responsibilities? This is not idle 
speculation given the general unpopularity of the Arab states as rich, corrupt and alien in the 
U.S., and argument and pressures to reduce dependency on, and involvement with, them.[5] 
Ironically as interest in eliminating nuclear weapons has emerged in the West, interest elsewhere 
in acquiring them may have increased. The Obama administration, unlike its predecessor, is 
trying to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons, to set an example by reducing the inventory of 
weapons and accepting the CTBT and other measures to demonstrate its seriousness about non-
proliferation. Aspiring nuclear powers are not necessarily influenced by U.S. nuclear policy. The 
U.S. conventional dominance is incentive enough. And as the gap between the U.S. technological 
capabilities here have increased, so has the urge for an unconventional "equalizer.”[6] 
This poses problems for the nuclear taboo and for U.S. security policy. The Bush administration 
argued that for some states “these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of 
choice.”[7] The risks of use increase correspondingly. President Bush went further: “They seek 
weapons of mass destruction to keep the United States from helping allies and friends in the 
strategic parts of the world.” [8] Nuclear proliferation thus threatens, or at least complicates U.S. 
security policy. Clearly the diffusion of nuclear weapons could complicate access, intervention 
and the "free hand" the United States has had, not least in the Middle East.[9] (This relates to the 
NIC projection earlier). 
What does this say about deterrence and extended deterrence in a changed (multipolar?) world? 
So far U.S. non-proliferation policy vis a vis the difficult cases (North Korea and Iran) has been 
largely replaced by one of deterrence and containment. The United States needs to reassure old 
allies (notably Japan) while looking at new commitments. “The simplicity of relations when one 
party can concentrate its anxieties on a single other, and the ease of calculating forces and 
estimating the dangers they pose, may be lost.”[10] Neither the context nor the "lessons" of the 
Cold War confrontation may apply. 
Nor is it clear what the lessons regarding either deterrence or extended deterrence are. First, the 
conditions. 
The superpowers were not neighbors; had no territorial disputes; their armed conflicts were not 
with each other; and both were (it now appears), essentially status quo powers. Contrast this with 
for example India and Pakistan, where the conditions differ in every respect.[11] Here Waltz’s 
famous nuclear shadow which is supposed to inhibit conflict, has not done so. Rather, the 
existence of nuclear weapons enabled Pakistan to conduct a war of infiltration and support 
terrorist activities. There is also the question of the destabilizing effects of the process of 
proliferation, the gestation period over a number of years when other states are able to react, 
possibly militarily by strikes or by seeking an nuclear option as well.[12] Arms races, surprise 
attacks may follow. 
What of the lessons? If “deterrence presupposes that the threat of certain destruction of an 
enemy will induce prudence in that nation’s policies” [13] it clearly has not worked on the 
subcontinent. In abstract deterrence is easy: requiring even “a low-probability of carrying out a 
highly destructive attack, … the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on another country.” In this 
view the putative aggressor cannot be sure that the object state will not respond and that is 
enough for deterrence. The uncertainty “about controlling escalation is at the heart of 
deterrence.”[14] Can one be sure, with Waltz, that since “deterrence does not depend on 
rationality” but fear and that “One need not become preoccupied with the characteristics of the 
state that is to be deterred or scrutinize its leaders … in a nuclear world any state will be deterred 
by another state’s second strike forces”?[15] 
While this view is tenable, it is hardly persuasive. States may or may not judge their interests 
"correctly" and hence the risks they will run will differ, whatever the stakes. Whereas the political 
conflicts between the United States and the USSR “were matters of life and death” those 
"between Israel and her Arab neighbors … might appear to some of these governments as an 
issue for which anything must be risked.” [16] In looking back it might be the case that the 
experience of the Cold War suggests that “deterrence extends to vital interests beyond the 
homeland more easily than most have thought.” [17] If, indeed, extended deterrence was 
relatively easy then, will it continue to be so in the new environment, where new nuclear states 
might seek to extend their deterrence? 
The Case of Iran 
Anticipating Iran’s objectives is problematic as rhetoric is not tightly correlated with behavior. In all 
likelihood, the Iranians themselves do not know whether to build nuclear weapons or stop at the 
threshold. That type of long-term planning is simply not an Iranian characteristic, which is more 
inclined to improvise and adapt.[18] Virtually any proposition about Iran can be contradicted, most 
are about 50 percent right. Iran is ideological and pragmatic, revolutionary and conservative, rigid 
and flexible. 
Iran’s broader goals are clear: the elimination of the U.S. presence/influence in the Middle East 
and its substitution by Iran’s own hegemony and "model." Iranian behavior has been cautious and 
indirect, while slyly opportunistic. Domestic politics are important.: as a source of policy—activist 
or restrained—and as a motivator. Foreign policy is used for legitimation of the regime. At present 
Iran feels vulnerable domestically and exposed internationally: does that make it more likely to be 
accommodating/prudent or more activist/confrontational? 
Iran has developed no coherent theory or definition of deterrence. The term is used loosely to 
refer to an ability to retaliate or raise the costs, of an attack on Iran. Iran’s experience conditions 
how it is conceived. At the dawn of the revolution Iranian strategists were much taken by the 
Maoist idea of “people’s war.” Unfortunately defense in depth and a war of attrition did not serve 
Iran’s interests very well in the war with Iraq. Nor, for all the rhetoric since, did the “culture of 
martyrdom,” in which morale and volunteer-martyrs were expected to defeat modern arms. 
Surprised and impressed by Iraq’s use of missiles and chemical weapons, Iran scrambled to 
acquire surface to surface missiles, which since then have been built indigenously to substitute 
for aircraft, and to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers. Iran’s interest in missiles as a terror 
weapon as it experienced in the "war of the cities" is analytically separate from its subsequent 
interest in WMD (c.f., Hitler’s use of the VI andV2), which it may come to serve. 
Iran drew a number of lessons from the war with Iraq and later from the coalition war with Iraq in 
1991: 
• Insure against technological surprise (eg. missiles, CW,BW etc), cultivate options.  
• Look for equalizers or short cut for deterrence;  
• Rely on indigenous arms and  
• Do not rely on other’s inhibitions/restraint and do not count on the UNSC. 
The 1991 war reinforced Iran’s inclination for asymmetric war, which implies: 
• Never confront the United States on a conventional battlefield;  
• Emphasize the indirect approach, through militias, proxies and deniable allies;  
• Use power to deny, or threaten U.S. assets mines, anti-ship missiles, submarines;  
• Threaten and target U.S. regional allies as soft targets;  
• Threaten unpleasant self-immolation e.g., "close the straits of Hormuz." 
The lessons of post-2003 are still being digested but we can speculate on them: 
• U.S. military power unmatched but not equaled by political judgment.  
• U.S. regional presence/over-extension makes U.S. forces hostages and in extremis 
targets;  
• Play on ambiguity of nuclear intentions to inhibit Gulf states.  
• Play anti-Israeli card for ‘Arab street’ to inhibit Arab governments. 
Iran has a number of cultural/ political characteristics’ and lives in an environment in which 
proliferation will take place, which will condition the impact of that proliferation. We can 
enumerate these in summary form. 
• Iran has a sense of grievance and entitlement that translates into an emphasis on its 
unspecified rights (haq), respect etc. with little discussion of ‘responsibillity.’  
• Ideology and rhetoric risk making the regime a captive of its own making;  
• Related to this is a national narcissim that makes it ignorant, insensitive or dismissive of 
others’ concerns.[19]  
• Insistence on Iran’s leadership role and relevance of it ‘Hezbollah model’ together with a 
populist approach may lead to posturing for political purposes, and to 
impulses/constraints that entrap while provoking others.  
• The emergence of the IRGC as a political force may make command and control of any 
nascent nuclear capability less subject to civilian authority. This element is more 
ideological and more adventurist professionally [20]  
• Iran has weak conventional forces and might be tempted to rely on nuclear weapons as a 
substitute. 
Iran’s behavior will be influenced by the lessons it draws from its experience: 
• How does Iran read the wars in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza(2008/9)? As victories for the 
"Hezbollah model"? Or as messages from Israel about how disproportionate its 
response can be?  
• How does Iran interpret UNSC reaction to Korea? What does it learn from the 
U.S./Israel’s insistence on something being “unacceptable,” while accepting it?[21]  
• Does this enhance U.S./Israel credibility in the nuclear sphere?  
• Is the lesson of the past seven years: defiance pays?  
• How likely is it that the regime in Iran once it becomes "nuclear capable" will 
spontaneously moderate? 
The regional environment will also influence the impact of proliferation. 
The Middle East is an area of multiple, overlapping axis of conflicts: Arab/Israel; Arab/Arab; 
Arab/Iran; and Israel/Iran. Distances are short and with the diffusion of missiles, warning times 
are limited. This ‘tight coupling’ makes for the possibility of surprise attacks with little time to 
evaluate threats before response.[22] More serious still is the ambiguity about missile warheads; 
given this ambiguity, a state like Israel simply cannot afford to treat a missile coming from say 
Iran, as a conventional weapon. 
This opacity “raise[s] the risk of an inadvertent nuclear response”[23] finally there is the general 
opaqueness about programs and the unwillingness of states to enter into confidence building 
measures or strategic dialogues. This can lead to ignorance or miscalculation about other state’s 
“redlines.” One of the necessities in crises situations, (which abound in the Middle East) and 
especially in a future nuclearized environment, is the intensity of communication necessary 
between adversaries, whether through hotlines or other means.[24] As we see today, contact in 
this region is considered a favor bestowed on the other side, not a necessity for strategic stability. 
A Nuclear Capable Iran 
What exactly is a "nuclear capable" Iran and how would it behave? From the dawn of the nuclear 
era it was recognized that states might want to reassure themselves, in an uncertain world, by 
developing a nuclear option.[25] This kind of hedging is permitted under the NPT. The problem is 
that by stopping just short of the threshold it takes only a little impulse to go over it. Iran appears 
to have decided to go as near to the threshold as it can get, while remaining in the treaty. No one 
can be sure that it will not, once it has enough fissile material and confidence in its weaponization 
and delivery, simply break out of the treaty by denouncing it on some pretext or other. This is a 
distinct possibility. But it would entail certain costs and would be based on the premise that there 
are advantages to so doing or at least some strategic urgency. Furthermore it is not clear what 
the political benefits of a small and rudimentary capability may be. Could Iran translate that it into 
greater political influence in the region? Would it be more of a deterrent to an Israeli or U.S. 
attack on Iran? 
If no one knows, it is possibly because the Iranians themselves have not decided definitively, for 
while the program is unlikely to be a "bargaining chip," nor is it one characterized by strategic 
urgency, a crash program like Saddam Hussein’s. This does not mean that Iranian leaders have 
not talked as if they want nuclear weapon, or at least ambiguously, while denying any such an 
intention.[26] 
Israel 
In recent years regional politics have taken place against the backdrop of Iran’s nuclear program. 
Iran’s nuclear shadow was present in Israel’s wars in Lebanon and Gaza; where Israel sought 
forcibly to communicate the credibility of its deterrent. The GCC states have been acting under 
this shadow as well, inhibited, anxious and ambivalent. 
In the event that Iran remains with a virtual capability, its influence and potential for exploiting the 
capability, will remain as it is, limited, creating a source of anxiety for the GCC and strategic 
concern for Israel but not fundamentally changing the strategic picture. 
In the event that Iran leaves the NPT in favor of a declared capability, the implications for regional 
stability will be different. What kind of arsenal it chooses to build (minimal? second strike?) what 
kind of delivery systems; its declaratory doctrine; and its overall posture will be of interest 
especially to its neighbors. 
Iran could use its small nuclear forces: 
1. To deter major attacks on its homeland ( deterrence by punishment rather than denial);  
2. It could try or seek to lower the threshold of use to deter any attacks on it;  
3. Try to empower clients to act while keeping the nuclear weapons to “aggressively 
sanctuarize” Iran from punishment/ retaliation.[27] (i.e., as a cover for regional 
domination). 
How likely/plausible is this? A nuclear capability once achieved will certainly limit the freedom of 
action of the United States and Israel, especially in contemplating direct attacks on Iran itself. 
This will include any conventional attacks on the country which could be seen as regime-
threatening. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Iran could contemplate extending 
deterrence to its proxies, who would be open to punishment. Iranian forces outside of Iran itself 
would be in a similar position. Iran would have every incentive not to confront the U.S./Israel 
directly, for fear of open-ended escalation. 
As Waltz has observed “the problem of stretching a deterrent which was a Western alliance 
problem, does not apply to lesser nuclear states. Their problem is to protect themselves,” and 
because they are vulnerable to conventional attacks they rely on nuclear weapons. But these will 
be limited to use only if their survival is at stake.[28] In other words, “nuclear weapons deter 
adversaries from attacking one’s vital interests and not one’s minor interests.” Hence while 
deterrence of the homeland is relatively easy, seeking to deter attacks on minor or extended 
interests is problematic.[29] 
One potential problem in the case of Iran, which may seek to use its investment in nuclear 
weapons (and compensate for its weak conventional weapons) by having NWs cover lower-level 
conventional contingencies, by lowering the nuclear threshold, is the need for its leaders to 
recognize the limited practical utility of NWs, which are not all-purpose weapons. 
Iran and Israel have not clashed directly and have no major bilateral dispute other than the one 
Iran has chosen to pursue by positioning itself as the champion of the Palestinians and Muslims 
in general. This posturing has been expensive but relatively risk-free so far. As the risks go up, 
Iran is unlikely to exaggerate its own power and may shy away from further provocation. There 
are however, two risks. 
First, that Iran many be carried away with its faith in its own cunning, and insensitive to Israeli 
concerns, step over that state’s red-lines. The other is one inherent in strategic competition, 
especially where there is mutual incomprehension and no contact between adversaries. As Tom 
Schelling has suggested crisis-management rests on the ‘manipulation of shared risk’. But where 
the strategic appreciation of the risk is quite different on the two sides, “an element of radical 




Iran’s nuclear ambitions stem from its search for status and an important regional role. 
Antagonism toward, and fear of, the United States is an additional motive. Clearly an important 
part of this rivalry is centered on the Persian Gulf, where Iran want to become the leading power 
and to replace the existing order by one in which Tehran calls the shots. Iran has some 
advantages and some weaknesses in this quest. The advantages stem from U.S. mistakes and 
doubts about U.S. judgment and staying power. Iran’s “model” may also appeal to some in the 
region, especially the ‘dispossessed’ in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, and to those Arabs who believe 
that militant Islam stands a better chance than its secular competitors of dislodging Israel from 
Palestine. Iran. Of course, has played to this "Arab street." Iran’s liabilities are equally impressive. 
It is a Persian and Shi’i state generally distrusted by the Arab Sunnis. Moreover its size (whatever 
its regime) makes Iran a potential threat to the smaller, weaker Gulf states. Some of the GCC 
believe that Iran is territorially revisionist (UAE, Bahrain) and many see its revolutionary, 
republican, regime as a threat to monarchs/sheikhs. 
Iran is by far the most important state in the Gulf, demographically and physically, dominating its 
neighbors intentionally or not. In recent years the shadow of its nuclear ambitions has increased 
an existing inclination to defer Iran and to avoid antagonizing it. It is difficult to see how an 
ambiguous or overt Iranian nuclear capability would serve Iran’s objectives in the Persian Gulf. 
Would Iran expect the GCC states to end their defense relations with the U.S./West? Would Iran 
seek to neutralize the Gulf? 
Does Iran expect a level of post nuclear deference that would make it the security manager of the 
region? 
The GCC states by common account wish to avoid a military strike against Iran; prevent a nuclear 
Iran; and forestall a possible grand bargain between Washington and Tehran. Some of the GCC 
lean toward accommodating Iran ( "bandwaggoning"); others, to balancing it by closer ties with 
the U.S.; and many adopt both postures. No GCC state is in a position to seek an independent 
(i.e., national) balancing capability, at least in a meaningful time-frame. While leaning toward 
Israel for strategic reassurance, few states are able to formalize ties (Oman and Qatar being 
possible exceptions). 
No state in the region wishes to exchange U.S. for Iranian hegemony. The structure of Gulf 
politics, now upended by Iraq’s travails, will return to a triangular model, which suits the smaller 
GCC states the best. Iran is constrained from making excessive or overt demands on its 
neighbors by the possibility that it may drive them together. Tehran has sought to extend its 
influence in the region through governments, leaving the threat of subversion/terrorism in the 
background. The acquisition of a more overt nuclear capability might be used to intimidate 
governments, implied or indirect.But it would run the risk mentioned, of uniting the GCC and 
reinforcing their ties with the U.S. 
There is also the question of U.S. response. 
The United States and Extended Deterrence in the Gulf and Beyond 
Since the end of the Cold war, the United States has had no peer group adversary. It has not 
needed to use nuclear deterrence against a conventional threat. Whether in East Asia or the 
Middle East, the United States is able to balance any conventional threat by conventional forces, 
leaving its nuclear deterrent for nuclear threats. What does it mean to “deter Iran?” 
In the case of Israel the situation is clear. Iranian nuclear threats would be more than countered 
by Israel’s own nuclear arsenal. A U.S. nuclear guarantee might be useful as a means of 
reinforcing this deterrent, ensuring that there is no doubt in Tehran about the support Israel 
enjoys. It would be useful but not essential. (In the future, if arms control comes to the Middle 
East, a U.S. guarantee might be a precondition to the denuclearization of the region) 
In the Gulf in theory Iran could pose three types of threat: [31] 
• outright aggression by conventional forces;  
• indirect aggression, subversion, and  
• coercive nuclear threats. 
The U.S. military presence in the region, the need to cross the Gulf’s waters and the relatively 
weak state of Iranian conventional forces (especially airpower and air defense) suggest that this 
threat could be countered on its own terms. 
The threat from subversion would not be appreciably changed by Iran’s possession of nuclear 
weapons. Nor would it need to be countered by them. 
Translating nuclear weapons’ possession into meaningful political influence has proven difficult so 
far in the nuclear age. Nuclear threats if unimplemented devalue them and if implemented risk 
devastation. Against such threats a nuclear guarantee, express or implied, might be necessary or 
at least useful. 
What is Current U.S. Policy? 
The United States is encouraging the GCC states to cooperate militarily with each other and with 
the United States. This implies a continuation of a high level of arms sales to the area. The United 
States is considering the extension of a “ defense umbrella” to the region, in order to contain Iran 
and to offset any influence Tehran may gain from its nuclear program. [32] Formal discussion of 
the extension of a nuclear umbrella has not (yet) begun. In fact this may be problematic in terms 
of at least U.S. domestic politics, and possibly that of the GCC states, as well. Moreover it is not 
clear that it is necessary. 
As long as U.S. forces remain in the area, there is an implicit guarantee or deterrent. The third 
component of the U.S. defense relationship is assistance in the creation of an anti-missile 
defense system, which would reliably degrade any missile threat that Iran might pose to the 
region, thus neutralizing or at least diluting any advantage that Iran might gain. These three 
areas, improved regional defense cooperation, intensified defense ties with the United States and 
an anti-missile system, should go someway to reassuring the U.S. Gulf allies, in effect extending 
a security umbrella though not (yet?) a nuclear one.[33] 
Whether the United States needs to extend nuclear deterrence to the region in a formal manner, 
is unclear to this author. Such a commitment might be politically difficult. It might reassure the 
GCC states to resist possible Iranian nuclear coercion. But such coercion is less likely (and more 
risky) than subtle intimidation, the utilization of the nuclear shadow( if you will), which in turn can 
be just as easily resisted by presenting as strong political front and conventional defense. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email ccc@nps.edu 
with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be used for no other 
purpose. 
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